Human wealth evolution: trends and fluctuations by Sibani, Paolo & Rasmussen, Steen
Human wealth evolution: trends and fluctuations
Paolo Sibani1,∗ and Steen Rasmussen1,2∗
1,∗Center for Fundamental Living Technology (FLinT)
Department for Physics, Chemistry and Pharmacy,
University of Southern Denmark
2Santa Fe Institute, Santa Fe, NM 87501, USA
∗ paolo.sibani@sdu.dk and steen@sdu.dk
Is a causal description of human wealth history conceivable? To investigate the matter we intro-
duce a simple causal albeit strongly aggregated model, assuming that the observed wealth growth is
mainly driven by human collaborative efforts whose intensity itself increases with increasing wealth.
As an empirical reference we use time series describing eight centuries of per capita annual gross
domestic products (GDP) of three European countries, the UK, France and Sweden. The model
requires a population large enough for disruptive events, e.g. famine, epidemics and wars, not to
destroy the fundamental workings of society. Cultural interchanges between different geographical
areas are not explicitly taken into account. The wealth evolution trend can then be described by an
ordinary differential equation with three free parameters: one producing a short term exponential
growth rate, one defining an additional minute constant growth rate and finally one that specifies
the time scale below which human collaboration intensity can be treated as constant. Beyond that
scale, wealth enhances the fundamental collaborative infrastructure of society. The solution features
a finite time singularity, which implies infinite GDP per capita in finite time and thus suggests a lack
of long term sustainability. The year at which the singularity occurs has a slight variation near 2020
AD from one country to another. GDP time series curtailed after 1900 AD produce similar values
for the occurrence of the singularity, which thus could be predicted more than hundred years ago.
Curtailing the GDP series from the early years up to 1700 AD also produces stable and consistent
predictions for the singularity time. Power spectra are obtained for de-trended data spanning eight
centuries, as well as for the first and last four centuries of the same period. All spectra have an
overall signature where the power decays as the inverse frequency squared. The embedded peaks
are reminiscent of the cycles described in the economic literature, but are also present in time series
far predating industrialization. The background fluctuations in the GDP series is tentatively inter-
preted as societal response to disruptive stochastic events. e.g. new economic activities following
epochal discoveries, as well as wars and epidemics.
I. INTRODUCTION
The use and availability through history of resources,
natural as well as financial, was recently reviewed by
Turner [1], who highlights a lack of sustainability in the
way human activities are presently organized, reinforcing
many previous findings, see e.g. Meadows et al. [2]. A
number of additional indicators point to an ongoing so-
cietal transformation linked to the way new technologies
co-evolve with social structures [3].
In this work we reach similar conclusions, but base
them on a different line of arguments, rooted in the way
human interactions generate the economic output mea-
sured by Gross National Product (GDP) per capita [4].
GDP measures the market value of products and services
and is a dubious measure of the quality of life [5]. More
importantly, it is not directly linked to the abundance
or scarcity of any particular resource. With population
growth factored out, an increasing GDP per capita re-
flects the evolution of a societal organization, specifically
of the physical infrastructures and institutions needed to
maintain a population with shared cultural values and so-
cial and technological know-how. The structural frame-
work needed to generate the economic activities mea-
sured by per capita GDP will in the following be called
‘wealth’. The latter is strongly linked to the task selec-
tion and labour organization that generate market value
using whichever resources are available. It includes far
more than tradable assets, and its evolution generates
the complex dynamics observed in economics [6].
Our model’s predicted trend is in agreement with his-
torical data, but features a finite time singularity, mean-
ing that the GDP per capita will soon diverge to infinity.
That historical trends extracted from economical and de-
mographical indices might feature a singular point has
been mooted in the literature. Kapitza [7] showed that
the history of human population size is well described
assuming a growth rate proportional to the square of the
population. His hyperbolic growth model is similar to.
ours and implies a finite time singularity, happening very
close to our present times. Johansen and Sornette [8]
analyzed world population and GDP data over two mil-
lennia, together with financial time series over more than
one century, and fitted their data in different, but related
ways, the simplest being a power law that diverges at a
critical time tc. Finite time singularities are thus natu-
rally embedded in key data sets and that rapid changes
in the mechanisms producing them will occur to avert
singular behavior.
The kinship of diverse evolving systems, living or
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2not, was recently [9] discussed with focus on whether
their rate of change is decreasing or increasing. One
type of evolutionary dynamic optimizes a target on fast
timescales, e.g. all spontaneous physical processes mini-
mize their free energy and bacterial monocultures opti-
mize fitness in a constant environment [10]. Evolutionary
progress can here be viewed as overcoming a series of ever
increasing ‘record sized’ dynamical barriers of system
specific sort [11, 12]. Evolutionary expansion, the less
common type of evolution is not as well understood [13].
An example of evolutionary expansion dynamics is given
in [9] based on a time series of British GDP values per
person per year [14], a quantity whose trend has kept
increasing faster than exponentially since the late Mid-
dle Ages. Similarly fast GDP growth in different coun-
tries over nearly a millennium is shown for convenience
in Fig. 1. The same quantity is analyzed in [15] for 28
countries from the onset of the Industrial Revolution on-
wards and in [16] for Danish GDP data only. In most
cases, the growth law from the onset of the Industrial
Revolution is well fitted by f(t) ∝ exp(at2), where t is
time and a is a proportionality constant.
In this work, GDP time series for France, Sweden and
the UK are used as proxy for wealth produced by cul-
tural evolution. Surprisingly to us, a simple ordinary
differential equation (ODE) approximates GDP trends
which cover developments from the late middle ages to
present times. The model assumes that wealth grows at a
rate proportional to both (i) existing wealth representing
both current activity and heritage from the past, and (ii)
the intensity of human interactions. Our ODE features
a finite time singularity, which suggests a simple endoge-
nous mechanism signalling the end of one evolutionary
epoch and the start of a new one.
Data streams systematically curtailed to end in ∼ 1900
AD, i.e. earlier than a century ago, produce GDP trends
diverging at times which are all similar and quite close
to our near future. A similar procedure curtailing the
beginning of the GDP time series confirms that the pre-
dicted date of the singularity is robust to input varia-
tions, as long as the data stream starts around 1700 AD.
This all implies that a finite time singularity was already
predictable long ago and suggests that more recent de-
velopments also pointing to imminent changes of socio-
technical structures may be consequences of human in-
teraction patterns well established through the history of
Western societies. Our causal model of wealth develop-
ment assumes that the main circumstances underpinning
wealth growth have not changed significantly over hun-
dreds of years. This strong assumption is further scruti-
nized in Section 3.
The de-trended data are treated as a stationary pro-
cess and nine power-spectra are generated, three for each
country, based on the full time series and on two cur-
tailed ones, spanning the first and last four centuries of
data. A number of peaks are found, usually explained as
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Figure 1: GDP per capita of four different geographical ar-
eas plotted versus time on a logarithmic vertical scale. Note
the large initial differences and the faster than exponential
increase occurring in the last two centuries. Data for Italy,
Sweden and Turkey from the Maddison data base [18]. The
UK data are from [14].
cyclic economic phenomena based on modern data only,
see however [17]. Interestingly, all our nine data sets
produce similar groups of oscillation periods. More sig-
nificantly, the background signal falls off as the second
inverse power of frequency, indicating the presence of a
noisy component with a correlation time of the order of
sixty years. This is tentatively interpreted as due to his-
torical incidents, e.g. epochal innovations, epidemics and
wars may, which both excite autonomous oscillations and
have a lingering effect on GDP, the latter producing the
background signal of the power spectra.
II. THE MODEL
Over millennia, human societies have evolved from
small isolated groups bound by oral traditions to much
larger entities, where interactions are easier, more intense
and structured by a common language and norm setting
institutions which transcend human lives and secure con-
tinuity over manifold generations. Increasingly faster and
more intense communication has underpinned the coor-
dination and collaboration efforts driving human achieve-
ments.
For the last millennium one may assume, as we
presently do, that human agents have always been avail-
able to fill in the different functional or ‘professional’
niches of their society and that the size of a popula-
tion has not limited the pace of cultural evolution. The
bubonic plague (1334 AD) is a relevant example. It killed
almost half of the European population, but did not de-
stroy social structures and institutions and might even
have triggered the wave of cultural innovation that soon
after swept through Europe during the Renaissance.
Fig. 1 reveals considerable wealth differences across
3countries, or, more precisely, across geographical areas
conveniently labeled with their modern names. Notably,
the UK GDP was initially lowest, but overcame all others
in the early nineteen century and was again surpassed by
the Swedish GDP in the twentieth century.
The difference between evolutionary expansion and
evolutionary optimization partly lies in which indepen-
dent ‘time’ variable best fits their description. Evolution
processes promoted by events uniformly distributed in
astronomical or ‘wall-clock’ time, e.g. random energy
fluctuations in an aging spin-glass, cosmic rays, or ge-
netic mutations in biological organisms, have wall-clock
time as their natural variable. In contrast, human cul-
ture is mainly controlled by personal interactions whose
intensity has increased dramatically over time.
Limiting ourselves to communication technology in the
last eight hundred years in the Westerrn world„ writing,
an arduous undertaking for monks in the middle ages,
was greatly boosted by the introduction of the printing
press. Later came the telegraph, the telephone, then ra-
dio and tv, and more recently the internet, hand held
devices and the Internet of Things. Clearly, the amount
of human interactions occurring in, say, one hour of wall-
clock time, had a manyfold increase over the last eight
centuries [19].
To describe GDP evolution trends we use a dimension-
less quantity w called ‘wealth’, which we compare with
the likewise dimensionless ratios of GDP time series with
their initial values. Wealth has a simple dependence on
its natural time variable, τ , which only describes evolu-
tion over short scales. i.e. a few years. The dependence
on wall-clock time t describes evolution over centuries
and includes the effect of an increasing interaction inten-
sity.
Again, our wealth variable is meant to cover the social
structures ensuring a society’s cohesion and the distribu-
tion of knowledge to its inhabitants, e.g. political, reli-
gious and education systems, including science and tech-
nology. Wealth also includes physical infrastructures, e.g.
roads, railways and ports, and technical skills, i.e. the
ability to build and manufacture all complex items in
use, from cathedrals to airplanes. In other words both
the prerequisites for and the products of human economic
activities are included.
In terms of our ‘natural’ time variable τ , we posit that
wealth per capita is controlled by the simple ordinary
differential equation
dw
dτ
= αw(τ) + β. (1)
where α and β are positive real parameters. In a system
with constant interaction intensity and initial wealth w0,
wealth will thus grow as
w(τ) =
β
α
(eατ − 1)+w0eατ ≈ βτ +w0 for ατ  1. (2)
For small values of α we see a slow linear increase propor-
tional to β, which mirrors the absence of a mechanism
destroying wealth once it is created.
The connection between ‘natural’ and wall-clock time
variables were discussed in [9] for different examples. For
human wealth evolution we here assume that
τ(t) = γ
ˆ t
0
w(t′)dt′ (3)
which is mathematically equivalently to
dτ
dt
= γw(t), (4)
where γ is a proportionality constant. The connection
between τ and t describes that some fraction γ of the
wealth produced is used to improve communication speed
and efficiency, be it by e.g. building better roads or faster
computer chips.
Equation (3) expresses the current natural time τ in
terms of the current level of human interactions, which is
assumed proportional to the human wealth accumulated
over time. Expressed equivalently in Equation (4), the
current increase in human interactions is proportional to
the current wealth. For constant wealth, τ and t are
simply proportional. However, if wealth grows, so does
the intensity of human interactions, and τ(t) increases
faster than linearly.
To transform Eq. (1) from ‘natural’ to ‘wall clock’ time,
we substitute dwdτ from Eq. (1) and
dτ
dt from Eq. (4) in
dw(t)
dt
=
dw
dτ
dτ
dt
, (5)
to obtain
dw(t)
dt
= (αw(t) + β)w(t) = αw2(t) + βw(t). (6)
The proportionality constant γ is absorbed in the fitted
parameters α and β, and is left unspecified.
The solution to Eq. (6),
w(t) =
βw0
e−βt(β + αw0)− αw0 , (7)
features a finite time singularity at
t∗ =
1
β
log
(
1 +
β
αw0
)
. (8)
The singularity occurs at t∗ = 1αw0 in the limit β → 0.
The free parameters in Eq. (7), α, β and w0, are ob-
tained by fitting Eq. (7) to time series describing the an-
nual average GDP per capita of three different countries,
each series scaled by its initial value. The fitting proce-
dure minimizes the sum of squares E =
∑
i log
2(wi/di),
where i runs over the available data points.
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Figure 2: From top to bottom, data and fitted trend are for
the UK, France and Sweden, respectively. Time series of GDP
per capita are scaled by their initial value and plotted as blue
dots on a logarithmic axis. A red hatched line depicts the
fitted trend and the inserts show the de-trended data ∆w
divided by 100 for typographical convenience. The data fit
utilizes Eq. 7 and the fit parameters are given in Table (I).
Country w0 α (yrs−1) β (yrs−1) t∗ (AD)
UK 0.9670 0.0014 2.807 10−11 2026
France 0.7878 0.0017 3.793 10−11 2045
Sweden 0.7718 0.0018 10−7 2023
Table I: Columns 2-4 are the parameter values of Eq. (7)
obtained by minimizing the norm of the logarithmic difference
between data and theoretical prediction. Column 5 lists the
dates at which the model wealth diverges.
1700 1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000 2050
last included data point
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
si
ng
ul
ar
ity
UK
France
Sweden
Figure 3: For each country UK, France and Sweden, the date
of the predicted singularity is plotted vs. the final year of a
curtailed GDP time series.
In Fig. 2, both GDP data (blue dots) and our predicted
trend (red hatched line) are displayed for the UK, France
and Sweden, respectively. In each panel, the insert shows
the de-trended GDP fluctuations.
Imagine now a scientist of yore who tried to fit the
GDP data available at their time using our present ap-
proach. Would they also predict a singularity occur-
ring around 2025 AD? In other words, how far back in
time can the position of the singularity be predicted from
available data?
To investigate the issue, the later part of the full data
set is curtailed, producing data streams ending at years
1700, 1750, 1800 AD, etc, and up to present days. Using
the same algorithm on each curtailed data set leads to the
result shown in Fig. 3. The UK data available in 1750 AD
already yield a reasonable prediction, while the French
and Swedish data need to include times from from 1950
AD onwards. Conversely, to investigate the robustness
of the results when only recent data are used, the initial
parts of the data series can be curtailed. The results
are shown in Fig. 4. Except for a single Swedish data
point, the position of the singularity only shows minor
dependence on the initial time of the series and for all
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Figure 4: For each country UK, France and Sweden, the date
of the predicted singularity is plotted vs. the first year of a
curtailed GDP time series.
three countries, series limited to the last four centuries
already give consistent results.
Power spectra are usually extracted from stationary
time series and plotted as functions of the angular fre-
quency ω. In our case, the stationarity of the de-trended
fluctuations can only be approximate, since the pre-
dicted trend diverges and overshoots the data close to our
present time. Second, the cyclic frequency f = ω/2pi, i.e.
inverse time, is used as independent variable for easier
identification of the oscillation periods associated with
the peaks seen in Fig. 5, where power spectra are plotted
for each country, from top to bottom UK, France and
Sweden. In order to highlight historical continuity, three
power spectra are extracted for each country from data
pertaining to different periods.
Monotonically decreasing spectral intensities and un-
certain small frequency behavior are generally expected
for economic time series [20, 21]. In our case the same
f−2 power law signature, given by the full line, is shared
by all spectra, irrespective of their epoch and country
of origin. This power law signature was also noted in
shorter Danish GDP series [16].
To ensure integrability, the background contribution
must level off, or possibly decay, for f → 0. If it levels
off, it is associated [22] with an exponentially decaying
autocorrelation function of the time series of data. Our
time series are unfortunately too short to accurately as-
certain small f behavior. The presence of a plateau for
small f is not clear, and the veering off of the signal
can also be produced by a ‘long wave’ contribution. As
shown in Fig. 6, a straightforward inverse Fourier trans-
form nevertheless yields an autocorrelation function with
a clear exponential decay at short lag times, with a decay
time T in the range 50− 70 years.
Oscillatory behavior is widely discussed in analyses of
modern time series, see e.g. [23, 24]. Cycles with a period
of 7 - 11 years are usually referred to as business cycles,
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Figure 5: From top to bottom, data are for the UK, France
and Sweden, respectively. For each country, three power spec-
tra of the de-trended data ∆w are plotted vs. cyclic frequency.
As explained in the legend, one set pertains to the full time
series and the others to time series curtailed at the beginning
and at the end of the period. The straight line is a guide to
the eye, representing a power law with exponent −2. Curtail-
ing has a minor effect on the position of the peaks and on the
level of the f−2 data trend.
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Figure 6: The autocorrelation function of the de-trended
data for the full series is plotted on a logarithmic y axis. Initial
exponential decays, marked with hatched lines, are clearly dis-
cernible. Their decay times are estimated to be T = 53, 100
and 174 years for UK, French and Swedish data, respectively.
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Figure 7: For each power spectrum, the period (inverse fre-
quency) of the ten largest peaks is calculated, yielding a group
of nine different values for each peak index. The range of the
values found in each group is drawn as a vertical bar, and
plotted vs the corresponding mean. The hatched line is a
guide to the eye connecting all mean period values..
those with periods of 15 - 25 years are associated with
Simon Kuznets [25], and long cycles of 50 years or more
with Nikolai Kondratiev [26]. All these oscillations seem
to be present in our data.
The periods corresponding to the ten peaks of lowest
frequency are determined for all spectra, producing nine
values for each peak index. These periods characterize
oscillations in different countries and/or epochs. To in-
vestigate the variation across countries and epochs, the
range of values encountered in each group is plotted in
Fig. 7 vs. the corresponding mean period. Note that
nearby groups have overlapping ranges, confirming that
the same or nearly the same periods are found in data
from different areas or epochs. The longest cycles fea-
ture a stronger variation, which suggests caution in their
interpretation.
Tentatively, we associate the form of the power spec-
tra to uncorrelated random events impinging on society,
for short ‘historic noise’. Historic noise both triggers the
oscillatory behavior of a number of coupled stakehold-
ers and produces the background f−2 signature. The
latter describes a lingering response to a flow of unpre-
dictable events and the time scale T is what the system
typically needs to structurally re-adjust to perturbations,
e.g. through a slow change of societal focus and/or struc-
ture. Such hypothetical scenario generalizes descriptions
only including cycles generated by economic agents in-
teracting in a market. That the values of overall decay
time are close to the length of Kondratiev ‘long wave’
cycles [26] might be coincidental, but a clarification cer-
tainly deserves further analysis.
III. DISCUSSION
Our simplistic ‘single cause’ model features a strong
positive feed back loop: wealth growth is fundamen-
tally generated by human interactions and part of the
wealth produced goes into communication technologies
that increase the amount of interactions per unit of time
and thus human cooperation. This feedback loop is the
model’s basic assumption and produces its finite time
singularity.
A recent study in cell phone use as a function of com-
munity size provides some anecdotal support for our key
assumption. Using cell phone calls as indicators, increas-
ingly frequent human interactions were recently linked
to urbanization [27]. The main finding is that the total
number of contacts and the total communication activity
grow super-linearly with city population size, implying
that the larger the community is, the larger is the num-
ber interactions per capita. While not directly applicable
to historical data, this result suggests that communica-
tion intensity and urban size were similarly related in the
past. Since human cultural development and urbaniza-
tion proceeded in parallel as city sizes grew over time [28],
communication intensity must also have grown over time,
which buttresses the assumption behind our model’s fi-
nite time singularity.
That wealth generation is assumed to be driven by
the same mechanism over eight hundred years begs the
question of which human circumstances have staid put
through the dramatic changes which happened in the
same period, e.g. turning from agricultural to indus-
trial and to service based production. White [29] and
others [30] highlighted the strong emphasis that West-
ern culture puts on the value of individuals together with
their special relation to God and the rest of the world. In
the Jewish and Christian ethos these elements encourage
individuals to pursue self-fulfilment and the achievement
of the common good through a cooperative effort that in-
volves communication among peers and the exploitation
of available natural resources. The same principles per-
7meate our moral codexes and generate deep-lying human
interaction patterns, in particular the fact that wealth in
part is used to increase human communication intensity.
Our model implicitly assumes the existence of a struc-
tured population with shared cultural values able to en-
dogenously coordinate its resources for the achievement
of common goals. The medieval church comes to mind as
a relevant example from the past, and national states can
partly fill this role for the present. In contrast, many geo-
graphical areas corresponding to modern national states
do not fit well, having undergone considerable political
re-structuring in the course of the last eight centuries.
Consider e.g. Italian GDP data, initially high com-
pared to the rest of Europe, but remaining almost con-
stant until the middle of the nineteenth century, when
a phase of rapid economic development began. Italian
GDP was initially sustained by financial flows linked to
the commercial activities of e.g. the maritime republics,
of other city states and of the Holy See. These were
centers of excellence and, in modern terminology, would
count as international powers. The formation of a na-
tional Italian state is a more recent development, roughly
coinciding with the country’s beginning industrialization.
These factors we believe explain the relatively bad fits
obtained when applying the model to Italy and Turkey,
which seem to have abruptly imported an industrial so-
ciety model during the 19th century. In contrast, the
three countries chosen for our analysis maintained rea-
sonably stable national and sociopolitical structures over
the period considered, although Sweden’s adoption of an
industrial economy also happened rather abruptly in the
mid 19th century.
A different and well-established approach to explain
historical GDP data posits that significant new human
technology complexes, both physical - e.g. the steam
engine, the Internet, biotechnology - and social - e.g.
our laws, institutions, morals - co-evolve and produce
new exponential wealth-growth phases each with a char-
acteristic exponent, and thus generate a new period of
socio-technical development. Successive overlays of new
significant technologies, each growing exponentially, do
generate a super-exponential wealth-growth over an ex-
tended period [31][16][15], without reaching a finite time
singularity. In this framework, the abrupt shift in wealth
development at the onset of the Industrial Age reflects
significant societal and technological changes that war-
rant a different growth mechanism and thus a change of
causal description. Arguably, the statistical properties
of de-trended data can only retain a weak dependence
on how the trend is extracted. The oscillations emerging
from our analysis have similar periods across countries
and historical ages, and are all embedded in a stochas-
tic process producing the f−2 decay of all power spectra.
This component does not seem to be a recognized fea-
ture of long GDP time series. While further work will
be needed to ascertain its precise nature, a f−2 decay in
wealth fluctuation power spectra can hardly be ignored.
Finally, any type of time series analysis of partly con-
structed historical data as these should be cautioned
with the methods by which the data are constructed. In
our analysis we have assumed that neither a hyperbolic
growth trend, a f−2 decay in wealth development fluc-
tuations, nor cyclic wealth components are used in the
data construction.
IV. CONCLUSION
Time series covering the average GDP per capita
through eight centuries for three European countries, the
UK, France and Sweden, are used as proxies for cultural
evolution, a term which includes both social and techno-
logical developments. The data are analyzed as superpo-
sitions of a historical trend and short term fluctuations.
The trend is modelled using a simple ordinary differential
equation (ODE), for ‘wealth’, a dimensionless quantity
which represents all societal features linked to economic
activity. The ODE is constructed in two steps. Assum-
ing that once generated wealth is never destroyed and
using a ’natural’ time variable τ , produces a very simple,
asymptotically exponential dynamics, i.e. a fixed yearly
percentual increase, see Eq. (1). The second step intro-
duces how the wealth generated directly enhances the col-
laborative infrastructure expressed by Eqs. (3) and (4)
resulting in Eq. (6). This second step accelerates de-
velopment in terms of ’wall clock’ time, and produces a
trend which grows faster than exponentially and culmi-
nates in a finite time singularity, basically happening at
our present time.
The de-trended data are empirically described by their
power-spectrum, expressed for convenience as a function
of cyclic frequency f . A f−2 background decay in power
is seen in all investigated spectra and many peaks are vi-
sible with periods ranging from about ten years up to
the lifespan of individuals. Though reminiscent of eco-
nomic cycles, their presence in time series predating in-
dustrialization seems to require a more general explana-
tory mechanism. Further work is required to clarify the
mechanism behind these power spectra.
We propose that random events, e.g. inventions, epi-
demics and wars drive both the noisy component and
the oscillations of the GDP around its trend, with a de-
correlation time of the combined process of the order of
half a century. This time scale exceeds the duration of
one of the longest and bloodiest conflicts in Europe, the
Thirty Years’ War, 1618-1648. Its length might be re-
lated to that of humans’ active life, to the memory span
of individuals as well as to the life time of socio-technical
structures.
8V. OUTLOOK
Our prediction that GDP per capita will soon be infi-
nite is obviously unrealistic. Since the predicted trend is
nevertheless in reasonable agreement with data through
many centuries, structural changes must be under way.
Many other observations, beside insights from historical
data [8], point to imminent and radical societal transfor-
mations attributed e.g. to a growing mismatch between
new physical and social technologies [3]. From our van-
tage point, this gap is the proximate cause of many cur-
rent disruptions, e.g. human induced climate change [32]
and the concurrent ongoing sixth mass extinction [33].
Their roots date however much further back in time and
stem from established human interaction patterns.
If deep-lying cultural themes condition a development
about to reach its limits, technological fixes alone will not
solve the current predicament. Unfettered exploitation
of our natural environment is a well entrenched cultural
trait, already framed as an expression of Divine Will in
the book of Genesis [34]. This trait has certainly fuelled
wealth growth through many centuries, but its limita-
tions are increasingly recognized in the crowded world of
today. For example, Beinhocker and Hanauer [35] sug-
gest to measure economic performance in terms of ‘its
accumulated ability to solve human problems’ instead of
in terms of ‘the market value of all produced products
and services’. This requires consensus on what human
problems are, but could give increased political attention
to climate change mitigation and to combating poverty
and disease.
A second historical trait is our unrelenting focus on
communication speed improvement. Together with the
ever increasing power of information technologies, it
drives an evolutionary trend that upsets interaction pat-
terns established since time immemorial. Already a cen-
tury ago, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin [36] imagined that
a new evolutionary stage, called the ‘noosphere’, would
inevitably emerge from the strong interactions of human
minds. How to address a development in this general di-
rection is unclear, but with the obvious opportunities af-
forded by interaction technologies, controlling its course
certainly demands major societal efforts.
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